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Participation in international trade potentially brings huge benefits to 
developing countries. However, the design and setup of the international trade 
regime, most importantly the rules and regulations stipulated in the agreements of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO),  often make it difficult for developing 
countries to fully tap this potential. As will be argued in this paper using descriptive 
statistics, some of these agreements lead to imbalanced consequences for 
developing vs. developed countries. First, one of the key objectives of WTO 
agreements, namely to enhance member states  access to other members  markets, 
has so far been realized in a rather imbalanced fashion, to the detriment of 
developing countries. Second, various WTO stipulations contribute to reducing the 
“policy space” of developing countries, thereby hampering their ability to pursue 
national policies aimed at fostering economic development. A lot of this can be 
related to asymmetries in the governance structure of the WTO which help explain 
why international trade negotiations have preserved such imbalanced outcomes. 
Against this backdrop, this paper advocates for a pro-development international 
trade regime that facilitates a more sustainable integration of developing countries 
into the world economy and that supports their efforts to fully reap the benefits 




Thomas Bernhardt is a second-year Ph.D. student in economics at the New 
School for Social Research, and a visiting student at Columbia University s School 
of International and Public Affairs (SIPA). His areas of specialization are 
development economics and international economics. 
 
Keywords: International trade regime, WTO, imbalances, developing 
countries, market access, policy space. 
 
1. Introduction 
Participation in international trade offers an enormous opportunity for low- 
income countries to contribute to their economic and social development. However, 
this development potential is undermined by some of the rules and regulations of the 
international trade regime. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the most visible 





successor of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) after the 
“Uruguay Round” of multilateral trade negotiations, often referred to as the “Great 
Bargain.” The developing-country perspective on the “Great Bargain” was that they 
gained access to developed countries  markets in exchange for agreeing to include 
services and miscellaneous “trade-related aspects” in the WTO s agenda. This great 
bargain, however, did little to remove existing North-South imbalances in the world 
trading system and even introduced some new ones. Many of these imbalances 
reflect the reality of asymmetrical power relations in the global, political, and 
economic arena, which, in turn, lead to global economic governance outcomes that, 
in some cases, are to the detriment of developing countries. 
This paper intends to highlight and analyze the asymmetries that characterize 
the current international trade regime as reflected in WTO agreements. It first argues 
that one of the key objectives of international trade negotiations (under the auspices 
of both GATT and WTO), namely to create access to other countries  markets, has 
so far been realized in a rather imbalanced fashion. The second section then explores 
how different WTO agreements contribute to reducing the “policy space” of 
developing countries, thereby limiting their ability to pursue national policies that 
would foster their economic development. The third section, spotlights on 
asymmetries in the governance structure of the WTO to try to explain why 
international trade  negotiations have  preserved such  imbalanced  outcomes. The 
paper concludes with some final remarks. 
 
2. Imbalances in Market Access 
Access to the markets of advanced economies is important for developing 
countries so they can expand their exports and thereby earn the foreign exchange 
they need to pay for their imports (e.g. capital goods). In the short run, therefore, 
they seek market access to sectors where they currently have a comparative 
advantage – such as agriculture or textiles.1 However, as developing countries had 
not participated very actively in earlier rounds of multilateral trade negotiations under 
the GATT, trade in sectors of interest to them was not greatly liberalized at the time 
the Uruguay Round started in 1986 – while trade barriers in sectors of interest to 
advanced economies had already been brought down considerably (Stiglitz/Charlton 
2005: 42-45). Yet the Uruguay Round agenda reflected, in large part, the priorities of 
developed countries, so that these asymmetries were addressed only half-heartedly. 
As a result, WTO agreements perpetuate several of these imbalances. 
 
2.1 Northern protectionism in sectors of interest to the South 
 
Developing countries had expected that the Uruguay Round would help 
facilitate access to Northern markets, particularly in agriculture and textiles. These 
were sectors that had long been highly protected (through the Multi-Fiber 
Arrangement, or MFA) and exempt from multilateral trade negotiations but in which 




1 The longer-term perspective, which implies a move from static to dynamic comparative advantage, will 
be treated in the next section. 
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agriculture into the agenda of the WTO was initially considered a success for the 
South, as was the agreement to dismantle the MFA, albeit with a long transition 
period of ten years. In reality, however, both agriculture and textiles & clothing 
remained among the sectors subject to the highest levels of protection in the North 
(Khor/Ocampo 2010: 8).2 In other words, the tariff structure of industrial countries 
is still significantly biased against imports that typically come from developing 
countries, with average applied “Most Favored Nation” (MFN) duties on agricultural 
products, textiles and clothing far exceeding average duties on non-agricultural 
products in general (see Table 1). 
Table 1 also gives some indication of the tariff peaks that characterize the tariff 
profiles of advanced economies, especially the European Union (EU) and Japan, 
where only a tiny fraction of non-agricultural products but more than a fifth of 
agricultural imports are subject to duties exceeding 15%. Another feature of rich 
countries  tariff structures that harms developing countries and that was not 
adequately addressed in the Uruguay Round is a phenomenon known as tariff 
escalation. For agricultural countries, processing the fruits and vegetables they grow 
would represent an almost natural comparative advantage and an opportunity to 
create higher earnings than from exporting merely the raw produce. But industrial 
countries often design their tariffs so that tariffs increase parallel to the degree of 
processing – i.e. the more manufacturing involved, the higher the import duty. 
Canada, the EU, and Japan, for example, charge tariffs of 42, 24, and 65%, 
respectively, on fully processed food items but only 3, 15, and 35%, respectively, on 
the least processed products in this sector (World Bank 2002: 45).3 Such tariff 
escalation discourages industrialization based on forward linkages of traditional raw 
material exports, thereby stifling industrial diversification in developing countries 
(Stiglitz 2006: 87). 
In agriculture, trade is additionally distorted by the enormous financial 
support that Northern economies continue to provide their farmers. The Uruguay 
Round brought little  progress in this area, as the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM) allowed various exemptions to reduction 
commitments, thus permitting a considerable number of agricultural subsidies to be 
maintained, even on a permanent basis. These loopholes have allowed Northern 
countries to re-structure (or simply re-label) their support for agriculture. Whereas 
support for outlawing trade-distortion has shrunk, more acceptable subsidies have 
increased.4 Consequently, in Canada and the U.S., producer support as a share of 
total agricultural production value has remained basically the same since 1995, the 
 
 
2 The Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and Clothing set a long transition period that allowed 
affected (mainly developed) countries to progressively phase out their import quotas and other 
restrictions. Yet few countries actually took a gradual approach but rather retained protection in most 
sensitive areas until the very end. Several countries even introduced some additional protections after 
liberalization (Khor/Ocampo 2010: 8). 
3 As an example, the U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule specifies that the general tariff on imported 
oranges is 1.9 cents/kg, on citrus fruit preserved in sugar 6 cents/kg, and on frozen orange juice 7.85 
cents/liter (U.S.ITC 2010). 
4 However, the distinction between subsidies that are trade-distorting and those that are not is 
questionable. By making farmers less risk-averse and/or increasing their creditworthiness and thus 
also their access to bank lending, even non-production-based support (like income support payments 
decoupled from production) can have an impact on output and prices and thereby generate trade 








Simple	  average	  of	  MFN	  applied	  duties	  on	   MFN	  applied	  duties	  >	  15%	  *	   Agriculture	  
SSG	  in	  %	  Non-­‐Ag.	  products	   Agric.	  products	   Textiles	   Clothing	   Non-­‐Ag.	  products	   Agric.	  products	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Canada	   3.7	   11.5	   6.6	   16.9	   6.7	   6.1	   5.9	  
European	  Communities	   4.0	   16.0	   6.6	   11.5	   1.1	   27.8	   23.8	  
Japan	   2.6	   23.6	   5.5	   9.2	   0.7	   22.8	   8.3	  
United	  States	   3.3	   5.3	   8.0	   11.7	   2.4	   6.0	   2.9	  
Table 1: Tariff profiles of selected advanced economies (in 2008) 
* Share of HS 6-digit subheadings in % 
Note: MFN = Most Favored Nation, Non-Ag. = Non-Agricultural, Agric. = Agricultural, SSG = Special Safeguards 
Duties > 15% = Share of HS 6-digit subheadings subject to ad valorem duties greater than 15%. 
Agriculture SSG in % = Percent of HS 6-digit subheadings in the schedule of agricultural concessions with at least one tariff 
line subject to Special Safeguards (SSG). 
Source: Author’s compilation, data from WTO/ITC/UNCTAD (2009) 
 
	   1990	   1995	   2000	   2005	   2006	   2007	   2008	   2009	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Canada	   37.6%	   22.2%	   22.1%	   25.2%	   24.2%	   20.8%	   13.9%	   22.1%	   	  
EU-­‐27	   35.8%	   40.6%	   39.1%	   36.7%	   35.5%	   28.6%	   26.7%	   28.6%	   	  
Japan	   54.5%	   65.9%	   63.9%	   57.5%	   55.0%	   49.8%	   51.2%	   51.7%	   	  
USA	   18.4%	   10.7%	   27.6%	   17.3%	   12.4%	   10.7%	   8.6%	   10.7%	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Table 2: Agricultural Producer Support Estimate as share of total production value. 
Source: Author’s compilation, data from OECD PSE Database 
 
founding year of the WTO, while in the EU and Japan it went down quite a bit, 
though still remaining at very high level (see Table 2). In 2009, OECD countries still 
spent about U.S.$253 billion (corresponding to 22% of aggregate gross farm receipts) 
in support of their agricultural producers. Even worse, more than half of these 
subsidies belong to perhaps the most distorting forms of support, i.e. support based 
on output (including border protection) and support based on unconstrained use of 
variable inputs (OECD 2010: 5). 
The problem is that these subsidies make it hard for developing-country 
producers to compete with those of industrial countries. They not only displace 
agricultural exports from the South but also suppress world prices5, with both effects 
directly impairing farm incomes in poor countries6. To conclude, as long as 
producers in developed countries receive subsidies of such a magnitude, there is no 




That trade in services was included in the WTO framework (in the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services, GATS) was due to the pressure from developed 
countries and part of the “Grand Bargain”. The GATS is one of the most flexible 
WTO agreements as it is based on a “positive list” approach where nations only 
liberalize those sectors that they want. Yet, strengths and interests differ a lot 
between the North and the South. Developing countries typically have abundant 
 
 
5 Dimaranan, Hertel, and Keeney (2003) estimate that OECD domestic support causes a downward 
pressure on world prices for many agricultural commodities of between 3.5 and 5%. 
6 According to some estimations, developing countries lose about U.S.$24 billion annually in 
agricultural and agro-industrial income due to protectionism and subsidies by the North 
(Stiglitz/Charlton 2005: 50). 
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unskilled labor and thus have a comparative advantage in less skill-intensive products 
while developed countries are rich in skilled labor. Overall, actual outcomes of 
negotiations under GATS have been biased in favor of the latter (Stiglitz/Charlton 
2005: 111). 
More specifically, advanced economies have pressured for liberalization in 
service sectors of their interest – particularly financial, information and 
telecommunications services – while trying to keep unskilled-labor intensive services 
(such as shipping and construction) off the agenda (Stiglitz 2006: 88). Moreover, they 
have been reluctant to liberalize under Mode 4 of GATS7 (“movement of natural 
persons”), which would allow the international movement of service providers and 
probably benefit Southern countries significantly. Yet, liberalization under Mode 4 
has advanced by far the least in terms of volume of scheduled commitments. In fact, 
the limited progress in this area has mainly involved the intra-corporate movement 
of skilled personnel (Marchetti 2004: 28) – an issue of interest to the North. 
Increasing labor mobility in a fashion beneficial to developing countries, particularly 
through facilitating temporary migration for workers from the South, on the other 
hand, has seen very little progress. Not allowing developing countries to use their 
comparative advantage in low- and medium-skill labor-intensive services comes at an 
immense cost in the form of foregone benefits especially to developing countries but 
also to global  efficiency. Indeed,  empirical  studies have estimated the  potential 
annual benefits of liberalization under Mode 4 to range between U.S.$150 and over 
U.S.$300 billion (Hertel et al. 1999: 17, Winters et al. 2003: 1159). 
 
2.3 Non-tariff trade barriers 
 
Market access for developing countries is additionally constrained by the use 
of non-tariff trade barriers by industrial countries. Although WTO agreements also 
address these sorts of barriers, progress has been limited. As a consequence, 
Southern countries making inroads into Northern markets have repeatedly found 
themselves facing non-tariff trade barriers, particularly dumping duties and technical 
standards (Khor/Ocampo 2010: 8). 
Non-tariff trade barriers can take different forms. Anti-dumping rules are a 
particularly popular barrier designed to stop the trade practice of selling goods below 
cost. Part of the problem with such schemes is how they are applied, as each country 
can set its own standard and have its own cost calculation method to determine 
whether imports are sold below costs. The current system thereby encourages the 
use of cost calculation formulas that make a finding of dumping very likely. In any 
case, the number of anti-dumping claims has grown significantly. In 1998, the U.S., 
the EU, Canada, and Australia together accounted for one third and thus an over- 
proportional share of all anti-dumping cases (Amsden 2003: 85). Between 1995 and 
2002, 2,063 dumping cases were initiated, with the U.S. (279) and the EU (255) 
among the largest initiators. “It does not seem sensible,” Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew 
Charlton argue, “that the countries with the largest capacity to absorb shocks and 
 
 
7 The GATS identifies four modes of service delivery, all potentially open to liberalization. However, 
liberalization has been uneven: Modes 1 (“cross-border supply”) and 2 (“consumption abroad”) have 
seen more liberalization than Modes 3 (“commercial presence”) and, particularly, 4 (Marchetti, 2004: 







Figure 1: World exports in selected sectors (1989-2009, Index: 1995 = 100). 
Source: Author’s illustration, data from WTO Statistics Database 
 
compensate import-competing interests should be the most common users of anti- 
dumping laws.” (Stiglitz/Charlton 2005: 127) To put it another way, instead of 
protecting industries that suffer from intensified foreign competition by by resorting 
to anti-dumping laws, these countries would have other economic and social policies 
at their disposal to deal with the consequences of competitive imports that make 
inroads into their markets. 
Yet, dumping duties have been the type of non-tariff trade barrier most 
utilized by industrial countries, the main reason being that they can provide longer- 
term or even permanent protection. This distinguishes them from safeguards, another 
type of non-tariff trade barrier, which may be applied only temporarily to help a 
country or industry adjust to an unanticipated large increase (“surge”) of imports. 
Still, the use of safeguards has risen dramatically, from two cases in 1995 to 132 in 
2002 (Stiglitz/Charlton 2005: 128). There are indications that Southern countries 




8 The reasons for this differ between trade in manufacturing goods and trade in agricultural goods. As 
for manufacturing goods, the WTO Safeguards Agreement requires that the member country that 
activates a safeguard measure (and thereby curtails trade) must give something in return, for example 
by lowering the tariffs in another sector. In fact, the exporting country (or countries) affected by the 
imposition of a safeguard measure can seek compensation through consultations. If these 
consultations do not lead to an agreement, the exporting country/countries may retaliate by taking 
equivalent action (e.g. raising tariffs on exports originating from the country that took safeguard 
action). This threat of retaliation (especially from richer countries) might discourage developing 
countries from considering the use of safeguards. By contrast, the special safeguards provisions (SSG) 
for agriculture (as defined in the Agreement on Agriculture) differ from normal safeguards. More 
precisely, SSG are only applicable to those products that were included in the Uruguay Round 
“tariffication process” (i.e. the effort to convert all agricultural non-tariff trade barriers into bound 
tariffs) and which were designated by a member country as eligible for the SSG in its Schedule of 
Commitments. Most developing countries cannot use these SSG simply because they set their bound 




















Consilience Bernhardt: North-South Trade Imbalances 
	  




notably the U.S., have repeatedly abused safeguard measures, often employing them 
to protect an industry in decline even when the underlying problem cannot be 
causally traced back to a surge of imports. For example, as the last column in Table 1 
shows, a non-negligible percentage of agricultural goods in the EU and Japan is 
protected by Special Safeguard (SSG) provisions. 
Other forms of non-tariff trade barriers are technical standards and quantitative 
restrictions (QRs). Technical laws (e.g. sanitary and phytosanitary standards) can be 
complex and opaque and often constitute an important barrier to trade – in some 
cases deliberately so (Stiglitz 2006: 95). QRs were actually prohibited during the 
Uruguay Round, except as emergency tools in the case of balance of payments crises 
- the clause typically relevant for the South. Yet, while their use as emergency 
measures was put under stricter disciplines, QRs were given greater room in textiles 
during the phasing out of the MFA, in the general safeguards agreement, and de facto 
also in agriculture, thereby creating another North-South asymmetry (Khor/Ocampo 
2010: 6). 
So, as this section showed, facilitation of access to Northern markets did not 
keep up with the expectations that Southern countries had after the Uruguay Round. 
Rather, different trade barriers and restrictions remained in place, perpetuating 
North-South imbalances in market access. Consequently, after the implementation of 
Uruguay Round commitments, trade-weighted developed-country tariffs against 
imports from developing countries are on average more than four times higher than 
against goods produced by other developed countries (3.4% vs. 0.8%) 
(Hertel/Martin 2000: 464). This is reflected in Figure 1 which shows that trade in 
agricultural products, textiles and clothing has developed much more slowly since 
1995 than world merchandise trade in general.9 A closer look reveals that world trade 
in agricultural products (in value terms) accelerated from 2003 on – though largely 
due to a boom in commodity prices10 – while textiles and clothing exports somewhat 
picked up only around the same year, when the expiration date of the MFA became 
increasingly tangible. On the other hand, trade in services, where it is 
overwhelmingly rich countries that have a comparative advantage, grew impressively 
(and faster than world merchandise trade) over the last 20 years, and considerably so 
after the WTO (including GATS) was set up in 1995. 
 
3. The Reduction of Policy Space 
Many sectors where developing countries currently have a static comparative 
advantage (like agricultural commodities) may prove to be, in a sense, dead ends with 
regardlonger-term economic development. Loosely speaking, economic development 
requires Southern countries to move into sectors with higher rates of potential 





9 This is not to deny that factors other than tariff and non-tariff trade barriers determine international 
trade flows. However, the fact that trade in sectors of importance to developing countries has 
continuously underperformed services and overall merchandise trade is striking. 





Increased access to markets where they currently have a static comparative 
advantage is therefore not the only thing that the multilateral trading system should 
offer to developing countries in order to support development. It also has to grant 
developing countries sufficient room to maneuver (“policy space”) andpursue 
national development strategies that aim at promoting the development of dynamic 
comparative advantage in higher value-added economic activity. In other words, 
Southern countries need a certain autonomy in policy-making to be able to manage 
their integration into the world economy in a way that promotes economic 
development (Kumar/Gallagher 2006).11 Yet, various aspects of the new trade rules 
and domestic disciplines agreed upon in the Uruguay Round actually constrain this 
crucial policy space for developing countries. Some of them prohibit the use of 
instruments that had been freely deployed by the East Asian tigers as well as by 
today s industrialized nations at comparable stages of their development, most 
notably – as will be shown below – in the areas of intellectual property rights, 
subsidies, and investment. 
 
 
3.1 Intellectual property rights (IPRs) 
 
Among the Uruguay Round agreements signed was the agreement on Trade- 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). This happened on the 
initiative of the advanced economies who sought to force other countries to 
recognize their intellectual property.12 The TRIPS Agreement requires WTO 
member states to set minimal standards for the protection of the full range of 
intellectual property. From a North-South perspectives, it features certain 
imbalances. First, it aims at a global uniformization of IPR regimes according to 
Northern standards which burdens Southern countries with adjustment costs. More 
precisely, TRIPS requires the extension of IPR protection to typically 20 years in all 
fields of technology – whereas many developing countries previously had no or only 
very lax IPRs. Moreover, TRIPS obliged many countries to broaden the scope of 
what is patentable. Stricter IPRs clearly entail economic costs for developing 
countries. In the short term, not only implementation and adjustment costs but also 
welfare costs have arisen in the South for firms using foreign patented or newly 
patentable knowledge and for consumers who subsequently have to pay higher prices 
for patented products. As Figure 2 reveals, international payments for royalties and 
 
 
11 The theoretical underpinning of the need for policy space, particularly in the presence of market 
imperfections (which, in fact, are quite common in developing countries), has been provided by the 
“theory of second-best” which states that government policy can offset market failures 
(Lipsey/Lancaster 1956; see also Rodrik 2008). The empirical relevance of these theoretical insights, 
in turn, has been demonstrated vigorously by the development experience of the East Asian “tiger 
economies” in the second half of the 20th century, almost all of which relied on a wide range of 
government interventions (including trade, technology, and industrial policies) to spur development 
(Amsden 2001, 2003, Chang 2002, 2007, Rodrik 2001, Wade 2004). That trade can play an important 
role in the industrialization (and diversification) process that characterizes a country s structural 
transformation during the economic development process has been shown by structuralist 
development economists (see, for example, Chenery 1960, 1980, but also Gibbs 2008). These insights 
are highly relevant for the argument laid out here but treating them in detail would go beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
12 Yet, whether IPRs belong in a trade agreement at all is a topic of intense debate (Bhagwati 2008). 
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Figure 2: Low & middle income countries, flows of royalty and license fees in the 
BoP (million U.S.$, 1985-2009). 
Source: Author’s illustration, data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators Database 
 
licenses from low- and middle-income countries went up significantly since the 
inception of TRIPS in 1995. Northern countries hold 86% of all patents worldwide 
and receive 97% of all patent royalties. This makes it difficult for Southern countries 
to access technology and to enter the innovation process – or at least very expensive 
in terms of licensing such patents (UNDP 2003: 207). 
From a longer-term perspective, the TRIPS Agreement has significant 
repercussions for Southern countries  ability to deploy technology and industrial 
policy. Before TRIPS, developing countries could set their own IPR policies. With 
the aim of facilitating domestic firms  capabilities for responding to foreign 
innovations, many late industrializers relied maintained loose intellectual property 
rules, limited the duration of patents and often simply refused to grant patents for 
key products. Moreover, their governments tried to push technological progress by 
encouraging learning from foreign firms (often through public R&D efforts) and 
allowing different methods of imitative innovation (such as reverse-engineering of 
foreign patented products or simply copying existing foreign knowledge and 
techniques) (Gallagher 2008: 65; Stiglitz/Charlton 2005: 103). Under the TRIPS 
Agreement, developing countries now are “constrained by having to adhere to IPR 
standards that are high compared not only to what they previously had, but also 
what the developed countries had when they were at their initial stages of 
industrialization” (Khor/Ocampo 2010: 13). That, in a sense, represents a historical 
asymmetry as many tools and policies commonly used by today s advanced 
economies during their development process are no longer available to the South 
(Chang 2001). 
 
3.2 Investment policies 
 
The agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) was newly 
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Like TRIPS, it reduces WTO member states  policy space by prohibiting the use of 
a number of investment-performance-related measures that allegedly distort trade 
but that have, however, been successfully deployed both by early Northern and late 
East Asian industrializers. 
For example, as part of targeted industrial policies, several East Asian 
countries actively encouraged foreign investment in certain sectors but stipulated 
that the majority of the firm be owned by national citizens, that certain local content 
and sourcing requirements were met, that technology was transferred, and that 
some R&D was conducted in the host country, with a certain percentage of local 
staff being employed in such processes (Gallagher 2008). Moreover, they often 
imposed certain performance requirements such as export-import balancing 
requirements (which make foreign firms use domestic rather than imported inputs) 
which, together with domestic content requirements, played an important role in 
forging linkages to the local economy and thereby generating spillover effects. All 
these policies are now considerably restricted under TRIMs, making it more difficult 
for developing countries to be selective about foreign investment (Khor/Ocampo 




Further restrictions are imposed on a country s policy space by the WTO s 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) which prohibits, for 
countries with a per capita GDP exceeding U.S.$1,000, all forms of export subsidies. 
Yet, export subsidies are among the major subsidy instruments used by developing 
countries and were deployed successfully by South Korea and Taiwan, for example 
(Amsden 2001). Now, with all forms of export subsidies being forbidden under the 
SCM, Southern countries  ability to diversify their exports and to help their firms 
break into global markets is severely constrained (Khor/Ocampo 2010: 6). 
At the same time, as detailed above, rich countries continue to heavily 
subsidize their agricultural sectors. Here, the SCM agreement only had the effect of 
making Northern countries re-structure their support from export to domestic 
subsidies.13 Yet, the distinction between export and domestic subsidies is somewhat 
artificial, and the trade effects of domestic subsidies are often understated. Apart 
from agricultural subsidies, three other types of subsidies are explicitly permitted in 
Article 8 of the SCM, namely for R&D, regional development, and environmental 
adaptation – all three being important instruments of intervention used by Northern 
countries (Aguayo/Gallagher 2005). There is, therefore, a pronounced North-South 
imbalance in the treatment of subsidies. As a result, while a mere 4% of developed- 
country exports are subsidized by another WTO member, this share is much larger 
for middle-income countries (6.4%) and low-income countries (29.4%; not including 






13 For example, between 1990 and 1998-9, the U.S. and the EU reduced their annual export subsidies 
for cereals and beef by U.S.$4.1 billion. In the same period, annual domestic support for these goods, 
which is treated more permissively in the WTO, grew by about U.S.$18.9 billion in the EU alone 
(ABARE 2001: 3). 
Consilience Bernhardt: North-South Trade Imbalances 
	  
	   133	  
 
3.4 Erosion of “Special and Differential Treatment” (SDT) 
 
In theory, the WTO recognizes the particular needs of developing countries 
via the principle of “Special and Differential Treatment” (SDT). Prior to the 
Uruguay Round, the GATT provided developing countries with differential 
treatment and thus additional policy space. For instance, it allowed them to keep 
most tariffs unbound, make use of quantitative import restrictions, and maintain 
domestic content requirements on foreign firms. In the Uruguay Round, however, 
“[a]lthough not entirely eliminated, the SDT principle was significantly eroded, 
particularly for middle-income developing countries” (Khor/Ocampo 2010: 4). 
In fact, there are now three forms of SDT in the WTO agreements that 
resulted from the Uruguay Round: trade preferences, modulation of commitments, 
and declarations of support. In its first form, SDT allows industrial countries to 
deviate from the principles of reciprocity and MFN by according differential and 
more favorable treatment to developing countries (e.g. by giving them preferential 
market access in the form of lower tariffs on their exports).14 The problem is that the 
current system makes preferential treatment entirely voluntary, i.e. the legal 
enforceability of these provisions is questionable (IISD 2003: 2).15 By contrast, SDT 
provisions that permit a modulation of commitments according to the member 
country s level of development are legally enforceable and, hence, are currently the 
most substantial form of SDT.16 The third area of SDT, essentially the declarations 
of support for Southern countries, is entirely unenforceable. Against this backdrop, 
there are two principal problems with the status quo of SDT: First, those SDT 
provisions that are legally enforceable amount to eroding assets. The implementation 
delays granted by the TRIPS, SCM, and Agriculture Agreements, for instance, ceased 
to provide differential treatment once the extended transition period expired. 
Second, large parts of the new “trade-related aspects” agenda are without any legally 
enforceable SDT. Overall, many developing countries are unhappy about “the lack 
of „hard law  SDT provisions in the Uruguay Round results” (IISD 2003: 2). 
To conclude, it is of course true, as Amsden (2003) and Gallagher (2008) 
argue, that the policy space for developing countries has not vanished altogether as a 
result of WTO agreements. However, the point here is that the expansion of the 
scope of the multilateral trading regime has clearly reduced the policy  space  for 




14 Two examples of such preferential schemes are the EU s “Everything But Arms” initiative and the 
U.S. s “Afri-can Growth and Opportunity Act”, which non-reciprocally remove tariffs on a wide 
range of products imported from the poorest countries. However, the World Bank (2004: 154) found 
that the overall impact of these schemes has been fairly limited, with complicated rules of origin 
provisions seeming to be at least partially responsible. 
15 Preferences are not binding on grantor countries and can be changed to exclude certain products or 
withdrawn entirely at the grantor nation s discretion, creating uncertainty for grantee countries. 
(Keck/Low 2004, Hoekman 2004: 3-4, WTO 2004: 25). 
16 Examples include the Agreement on Agriculture (which required developed countries to cut their 
tariffs by 36% over six years whereas developing countries were given 10 years to lower their tariffs by 
only 24% while LDCs were exempted from tariff reductions altogether), the TRIPS Agreement 
(which gave industrial countries one year to implement its provisions, but developing countries five 






4. Asymmetries in WTO Governance 
Formally, the WTO is a democratic institution with its governance structure 
based on the “one country, one vote” principle and its decision-making requiring 
consensus. In practice, how-ever, not all WTO member countries have an equal say 
in the institution s agenda-setting and decision-making, so “informal oligarchy” 
(Evans 2003) seems to be a more accurate description. 
One core problem in governance is the way in which negotiations occur. In 
fact, in what is commonly referred to as the “Green Room” process, many initial 
trade negotiations (both under GATT and WTO auspices) have taken place and still 
occur in informal meetings among a limited number of countries dominated by the 
Northern WTO members. Typically, the major advanced economies negotiate among 
themselves to come up with a common position. They then select a few (influential) 
developing countries to negotiate within another round of informal meetings with the 
aim of winning them over, often by putting pressure on them to break ranks with 
other developing countries (Stiglitz 2006: 98). Most WTO members are not informed 
about or even invited to these meetings and often do not know what is negotiated 
there. The purpose of such meetings is to shape the agenda of negotiations and to reach 
agreements within a relatively small group which are then easier to translate into the 
“consensus” required for the formal decision-making (Dervis 2005: 170, TWN et al. 
2003). 
During the initial years of the WTO, this informal system was led by the so- 
called “Quad” (U.S., EU, Japan and Canada) but became increasingly dysfunctional 
with the emergence of several dynamic developing countries. Consequently, since 2004, 
a newly formed “Group of 6” (U.S., EU, Japan, Australia, Brazil, and India) has 
engaged in small-group, informal agriculture negotiations, at times also including China. 
The inclusion of Brazil, India and China in this informal circle has, in a sense, enhanced 
the presence and role of developing countries in key decision-making forums. In reality, 
however it has done little to remove the North-South asymmetry in participation and 
decision-making, especially as these three countries explicitly represent only themselves 
in these meetings and not the developing countries as a group (for which they do not 
have a mandate anyway) (Khor/Ocampo 2010: 25). This lack of transparency in WTO 
working methods and decision-making mechanisms is compounded by the fact that 
various low-income countries cannot afford to have a Mission or a representative at 
the WTO headquarters in Geneva. This impinges on their ability to follow current 
discussions and participate in important meetings and negotiations (Stiglitz/Charlton 
2005: 82). 
Overall, in some contrast to its democratic setup, WTO governance has in 
practice been riddled with North-South asymmetries in participation and voice. The 
economic power of the advanced industrial countries has often been felt in the 
process of setting the agenda (with the focus of envisaged negotiations often put on 
issues of interest to developed rather than developing countries) and negotiating the 
rules (Evans 2003: 295). Once rules are agreed upon by WTO member states, states 
are held accountable for the commitments they made through the WTO s dispute 
settlement mechanism (DSM). The DSM can be used by any member state who alleges 
that another member country violates WTO rules. Interestingly, no WTO body has 
the power to initiate litigation or implement sanctions in case violations of rules are 
found. Rather, WTO agreements delegate the authority to sanction – via trade 
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Table 3: WTO Dispute Settlement Cases (1995-2008). 
Source: Khor/Ocampo (2010: 22) 
 
retaliations – to the member states themselves. In practice, the DSM has proven to 
be effective17: it has been used quite actively and, importantly, it has been applied in 
all directions, i.e. by both developed and developing countries against both 
developed and developing countries. 
However, there has also been a certain asymmetry in the use of the DSM: 
While more than two thirds of WTO members are developing countries, over 60% 
of all complaints have been filed by developed countries (see Table 3). Part of the 
explanation of this under-proportional use by developing countries lies in the 
relatively high costs of resorting to the mechanism and in an inherent asymmetry in 
retaliation between rich and poor countries (Stiglitz/Charlton 2005: 82).18  Both 
factors make the use of the DSM less appealing to poorer WTO members and might 
even defer them from even considering a complaint in the first place (Srinivasan 
2007: 1056). Although there have been initiatives and proposals19, the inescapable 
reality of disparities in economic strength between different countries will make it 
difficult to overcome these asymmetries entirely. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
As we have seen, the current international trade regime as defined by WTO 
agreements is characterized by various imbalances from a North-South perspective. 




17 For favorable reviews see, for example, Ocampo (2010: 22), Srinivasan (2007) and WTO (2004: 50- 
51). 
18 The prospect of developing countries imposing retaliatory measures of last resort is not very 
frightening for violators of WTO rules from the North, given that such measures would most likely 
have only limited effects on the violator s trade. 
19 To remove the asymmetry in retaliation, it has been suggested that the WTO introduce monetary 
compensation of damages or to allow the trading of the right to retaliate (WTO 2004: 54-55). In an 
attempt to counter the asymmetry of the high costs of the legal procedure, in turn, an Advisory Centre 






negotiations under WTO auspices was launched in 2001 in Doha with the declared 
objective to make it a “Development Round.” However, the round is still ongoing 
and is in fact already the longest in the history of the GATT/WTO – a clear 
indication of the round s failure. One of the main reasons for this is that developing 
countries worry that the potential benefits of what is on the negotiation table are 
relatively small while the probable costs in terms of further loss of policy space are 
significant (Gallagher 2008). The negotiations now narrowly focus on core market- 
access issues, and the Northern economies more or less insist on reciprocity, so the 
initial developmental focus is has essentially disappeared. 
In order for the Doha Round to achieve a development-friendly outcome, a 
certain degree of non-reciprocity in trade liberalization commitments will be 
necessary, especially in non-agricultural market access (NAMA) negotiations. For 
example, developing countries should be permitted to identify a limited list of key 
strategic industries to be exempted (at least for a certain, reasonably long period of 
time) from tariff reduction commitments in their “schedules of concessions.” This 
would provide them with valuable space to pursue targeted industrial policies. At the 
same time, to improve developing countries  access to their markets, industrial 
countries should agree to a tariff reduction formula that explicitly tackles tariff peaks 
and tariff escalation, for example by imposing a cap on their tariff rates. In 
recognition of their exceptional development needs, the least developed countries 
(LDCs) should actually be granted duty-free access to Northern markets (at least for 
their manufactured goods). As an intermediate step, industrial countries could bring 
down their tariffs on products of interest to developing countries (e.g. textiles & 
clothing or agricultural products) to a level not exceeding their average level of tariffs 
on all other commodities. In terms of access to the agricultural markets of the North, 
the second key issue (besides tariff cuts) will be a reduction of subsidies in advanced 
economies. To this end, the somewhat artificial distinction between trade-distorting 
and non-distorting subsidies needs  to  be re-examined. This should lead to the 
adoption of more effective rules on the use of permitted subsidies (for example with 
regard to the eligibility criteria for recipients of subsidies) and the introduction of 
limits on the amounts receivable per agricultural producer (Khor 2007). Eventually, 
this would make it more difficult for developed countries to maintain their levels of 
public support to farmers by simply re-structuring or re-labeling their subsidies. As 
noted, many of these measures would require unilateral concessions by Northern 
countries and thus a deviation from the principle of reciprocity that is at the core of 
WTO agreements. This can be defended on the basis of the concept of “Special and 
Differential Treatment” (SDT) for developing countries. In fact, one of the 
objectives of the Doha Round – if it is to be a true development round – should be 
to strengthen or even expand SDT provisions in WTO agreements. One way to 
achieve this would be to adopt a Framework Agreement on SDT – as was indeed 
mentioned in the Doha Declaration. This would help to make SDT provisions more 
precise and effective and could serve to enhance their legal enforceability. On the 
whole, such a consolidation of the principle of SDT would positively impact 
developing countries  policy space and their access to Northern markets. 
For these outcomes of the Doha Round to become more likely, substantive 
steps must be taken towards institutional and governance reforms of the WTO. 
Among other things, this should include the abandonment of the practice of 
negotiating  in  the  “Green  Room,”  thereby  enhancing  the  transparency  of  and
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participation in decision-making and negotiation processes. At the same time, 
developing countries ought to try to increase their voice and weight in trade 
negotiations by coordinating their positions and forming coalitions.20 Such efforts 
should be supported by institutional enhancement, for example by the establishment 
of a permanent advisory body (whose task would be to advise developing countries 
on how to improve the effectiveness of their bargaining) and the installation of an 
independent evaluation unit (which would conduct studies to objectively assess the 
impact of possible future liberalization commitments on developing countries and 
compare and evaluate alternative scenarios) (Stiglitz/Charlton 2004). 
Overall, it is extremely important that the Doha Round is revived and turned 
into a real development round with substantial outcomes meeting the demands and 
needs of the poorer WTO members. A successful conclusion of the Doha Round 
could, as an additional benefit, remove the perception among developing countries 
as well as civil society that the rich countries use the WTO to further their interests 
and those of their corporate sectors. Eliminating this view would thereby enhance 
the legitimacy of the WTO as a forum for international trade negotiations. The 
alternative to a successful Doha Round is an increase in bilateral and regional free 
trade agreements (FTAs). However, this is an even less appealing outcome from a 
development perspective, not only because they more often divert rather than create 
trade (Bhagwati 2008: Ch. 3) but also because developing countries have even less 
bargaining power in a bilateral setting than in a multilateral setting, where they can, at 
least in theory, form coalitions. In fact, this fear has already materialized in the 
inclusion of “WTO plus” stipulations in such FTAs (Evans 2003: 296, 
Khor/Ocampo 2010: Ch. II). 
The potential of the international trade regime to support the development 
efforts of  countries  in the global South thus  remains considerably unexploited. 
Unfortunately, the way the current Doha Round of multilateral negotiations has 



















20 This is of course not an easy task in practice. The developing countries are not a homogeneous 
group and their interests and objectives can differ substantially, depending, inter alia, on their 
respective productive structures and trade patterns. However, currently even efforts of developing 
countries that have common interests and shared objectives are highly uncoordinated. It would 
therefore be a major step forward if developing countries with a common position formed coalitions 
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